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ABSTRACT
This thesis presents a model for the buying behavior of consumers in a technology
market. In this model, a potential consumer is not perfectly rational, but exhibits
bounded rationality following the axioms of prospect theory: reference dependence,
diminishing returns and loss sensitivity. To evaluate the products on different cri-
teria, the analytic hierarchy process is used, which allows for relative comparisons.
The analytic hierarchy process proposes that when making a choice between several
alternatives, one should measure the products by comparing them relative to each
other. This allows the user to put numbers to subjective criteria. Additionally, evi-
dence suggests that a consumer will often consider not only their own evaluation of
a product, but also the choices of other consumers. Thus, the model in this paper
applies prospect theory to products with multiple attributes using word of mouth as
a criteria in the evaluation.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Manufacturers, firms and retail outlets have to make decisions on pricing, promotion
and inventory, even if they are not selling directly to end-users. Because of this
the literature is filled with economic models intended to help make better decisions.
Most of these models, whether they are trying to optimize the amount of inventory
to keep on hand or decide the best time to release a new product, in general rely
on knowing or predicting an appropriate demand function. Often these models will
assume the demand comes from a well known process (e.g. Bass (1969) diffusion) or
make simplifying assumptions about the demand to do their analysis. One problem
with this approach is that it does not allow for the possibility of social dynamics, which
can greatly influence behavior of a potential customer. This is especially relevant in
an age where the internet has transformed how people look for and communicate
about new products. Social networks have been shown to have a great influence on
subjects such as biology, neuroscience, computer science and economics, as Watts
(1999) demonstrates (Watts and Strogatz, 1998, p. 440). In fact, word of mouth and
network structure have been shown by Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1997) and Aral
and Walker (2011) to have significant effects on buying behavior.
In addition, Kiesling et al. (2012) suggests that while some aggregate models,
such as Bass diffusion, can account for word of mouth effects, they do not allow
for any heterogeneity in consumers or allow for one to ask what-if type questions.
Having these features is especially useful for simulation studies and is particularly
suited for agent based modeling. This thesis aims to model the decision process for
an individual, which can be used as a framework for an agent based simulation.
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Expected utility theory for a long time has been the reigning model on rational
choice. However it has drawn criticism in that rational behavior of an individual is
the exception, rather than the rule. The assumption of a perfectly rational agent has
been criticized by some, including Kahneman and Tversky (1979), who proposed a
generalization to expected utility theory called prospect theory. In the years since
it has been considered one of the best models for decision making under risk (Bar-
beris, 2012), uncertain outcomes (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) and riskless choice
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). The riskless choice model is especially useful as
it provides a framework for extending prospect theory to multiple attributes. This
problem was studied by Bleichrodt et al. (2009), Zank (2001) and Bleichrodt and
Miyamoto (2003).
Applying prospect theory to products with more than one criterion raises the
question of how the attributes of products are evaluated, and how to quantify the
relative strengths and weaknesses. Stevens (1946) describes the ratio scale of mea-
surement in which objects are compared as ratios, which serves as a basis for the
analytic hierarchy process (AHP). Originally developed in the late 1970’s, AHP is
an approach to decision making in which individual preferences are converted into
weights by measuring the preferences as ratios (Forman and Gass, 2001, p. 4). The
process of converting to a ratio scale is also used to rank the products relative to each
other with respect to different criteria (Saaty, 1990). Bernasconi et al. (2010) give
empirical evidence to suggest that the method of ratio scaling mimics the cognitive
process involved in decision making. They go on to suggest that the approach is
applicable to prospect theory.
Prospect theory and AHP both provide a good framework for understanding the
decision process, but neither take into account word of mouth effects. Because it
is well known that communication between potential customers can greatly influence
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decisions, and the social network structure greatly influences the speed and complete-
ness of the diffusion (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1997, p. 290), word of mouth is
an integral component to this model.
This thesis describes a decision model which merges these three concepts, prospect
theory, AHP and networks. Prospect theory is used to capture the decisions made
by people who are not perfectly rational, while AHP is used to provide a method for
measuring the strength of different choices, serving as an input to the functions of
prospect theory. Word of mouth effects are then used as an input which reflects the
observation that success or failure of a new product depends heavily on who and how
many people spread knowledge of it.
Prospect theory, AHP and networks are discussed in detail in chapters 2,3 and 4,
respectively. Chapter 5 synthesizes these ideas in a single model and the influence
of word of mouth and reference dependence are demonstrated through examples.
Chapter 6 discusses the possibility that a technology market, as a whole, follows
prospect theory in deciding the success of a product.
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Chapter 2
PROSPECT THEORY
Prospect theory is widely accepted as one of the best explanations for violations of
expected utility theory. Consider a gamble with 50% chance to win $110, and a
50% chance to lose $100. Expected utility predicts that the decision maker would
evaluate 0.5 × $110 + 0.5 × $(−100) = $5 as the utility, making this gamble the
rational choice to maximize utility. But in fact most people declined to take this
gamble (Barberis, 2012, p. 4), violating expected utility. To demonstrate this and
other violations, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) collected data of the following form
by asking volunteers to choose between two prospects, prospect A: Win $X with a
probability p or prospect B : Win $Y with probability q or Z with probability r.
These can be represented as (X, p) and (Y, q;Z, r), respectively. The decision maker
is then assumed to evaluate each prospect and choose the one with the higher utility.
Kahneman and Tversky show several cases where the volunteers were systematically
irrational.
Endowment Effect and Status Quo Bias
Tversky and Kahneman (1991) describe an experiment in which participants were
given a decorated mug and asked how much they would be willing to sell it for. Some
of the participants were not given anything and were told they had the option of
receiving a sum of money or a mug. They were asked their preferences on what
amount of money would make them indifferent between the two options.
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The price the mug owners were willing to sell for and the price the other partic-
ipants would buy it for were different, with the mug owners choosing a higher price.
This discrepancy between the prices can be interpreted as the sellers endowing the
mug with more value simply by virtue of ownership.
Both the sellers and the participants who did not own a mug face the same problem
but with different references, his is demonstrated in figure 2.1, where the mug owners
are at state x, owning a mug, and the rest are at state r, choosing between x and y
(cash). This status quo bias means the mug owners saw selling as a loss, where the
buyers saw either option as a gain.
Figure 2.1: Different Reference Points Give Different Utilities.
Improvements versus Tradeoffs
In figure 2.1, both options x and y are assumed to be the same utility regardless
of the reference point. This is true when one is at r because either is seen as a gain.
However, when s1 is used, the choice of x is a gain in feature 1 combined with a loss
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in feature 2, while a choice of y is the opposite, with a gain in feature 2 and a loss in
feature 1. This is reversed when evaluating from s2.
Kahneman and Tversky hypothesize that when a decision maker is choosing be-
tween x and y from the position of s1, x will be preferred over y and vice versa for s2.
Indeed, evidence was found to support this. In a second study done with volunteers,
one group was given a coupon for a free dinner (s1), and the second group was given
a free professional photo portrait (s2). The subjects were then asked if they wanted
to exchange their gift for either two free dinners (x) or several more professional
portraits (y).
Almost nobody kept their original gift, with most at s1 choosing the second dinner,
and most with s2 choosing the portraits, confirming their hypothesis.
Value Function
From this evidence a new formulation for evaluating prospects was proposed where
the utility of a good is expressed with a value function v(·). The value function v(·)
captures the irrational behavior described by specifying a nonlinear equation which
represents the three axioms of prospect theory: (i) gains and losses are defined relative
to a reference point; (ii) losses are perceived as larger than equivalent in magnitude
gains; (iii) the sensitivity to marginal increases in gains or losses is diminished with
larger magnitudes. These properties imply that the value function is concave/convex
when above/below the reference point, respectively, and that it is steeper for losses
then gains. One possible function is shown in figure 2.2 (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979, p. 281).
In their subsequent paper Tversky and Kahneman (1992) extended prospect the-
ory to uncertain outcomes. Data was used to estimate the parameters of the value
6
Figure 2.2: Kahneman and Tversky’s Example of a Value Function.
function. Since then there have been numerous papers and functional forms con-
sistent with the original axioms proposed (Stott, 2006, pp. 105-106). Tversky and
Kahneman (1991) dealt with choices for which the outcomes are known completely
without risk, accounting for reference dependence, loss aversion and diminishing re-
turns. The riskless choice model is used as a basis for this thesis, using the value
function proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1991).
While prospect theory is an important model for explaining how individuals are
not perfectly rational, there are difficulties in knowing how to apply it. This is because
there are not many well known applications of prospect theory (Barberis, 2012, p. 2).
Kahneman and Tversky also did not put forth any explanation for what the reference
should be.
One of the problems addressed by this thesis is the difficulty of measuring the
strength/weaknesses of choices. This is especially true when choices are judged on
entirely subjective criteria (e.g. color, style). Additionally, decisions are made without
accounting for social effects, which is considered in the coming chapters.
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Chapter 3
ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS
AHP is a methodology used in making complex choices. Originally formulated
in the 1970’s by Thomas Saaty (Saaty, 1977), the intention of AHP was to create
a practical and methodical system for making decisions (Forman and Gass, 2001, p.
4). Problems are formulated such that for a decision, the user selects from multiple
alternatives which are judged with respect to several criteria. An example is choosing
what computer to buy, where some of the criteria they are evaluated on are portability,
speed and cost. The defining feature is that the alternatives are judged not on absolute
measurements, but instead are judged relative to each other. This allows one to
effectively give rankings on criteria which are difficult to assign a numeric value to.
AHP suggests that when approaching a problem one should break it down into a
hierarchy. At the highest level of the hierarchy is the goal, or decision which one is
trying to make. At the bottom level are the alternatives one needs to make a decision
on. Between the two are the criteria with which the alternatives are judged, and each
level represents a cut of the problem representing different factors which go into the
problem.
Once the problem is organized as such, each level of the hierarchy is worked
through from the top down. The criteria are ranked and assigned weights with respect
to their relative importance to the problem. The alternatives are then ranked on how
well they meet each criteria. Comparing criteria or alternatives is done pairwise on
a scale from 1 to 9. Two alternatives a and b, for example, are compared by saying
a is four times better than b. In doing so objects are compared on a ratio scale, as
opposed to assigning a numeric value (Stevens, 1946, p. 679). This way of comparing
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is what allows AHP to rate things which are not easy to assign a number to, such
as style. In addition, it ensures that all measurements are on the same scale (Saaty,
1990, p. 10).
Comparison Matrix
Saaty (1990) describes how comparisons are made by creating a matrix. Suppose
one is given n objects to compare, O1, ..., On, and the goal is to rank the relative
strengths, s1, ..., sn ∈ R. A matrix O is created containing the pairwise ratios of the
strengths
O =

s1/s1 s1/s2 · · · s1/sn
s2/s1 s2/s2 · · · s2/sn
...
...
...
sn/s1 sn/s2 · · · sn/sn

. (3.1)
The i, jth entry of O is the relative advantage of Oi over Oj. One would say that Oi
is x times better than Oj and hence the i, j entry in the matrix would be x. By using
the ratios, one is essentially using the objects as units in measuring each other.
If this matrix, O = (oij), is consistent (i.e. ojk = oik/oij for i, j, k = 1, ...,dim(O)),
then the largest eigenvalue, λmax, is equal to the dimension of the comparison matrix,
λmax = n, and the vector (s1, s2, ..., sn)
t is an eigenvector
s1/s1 s1/s2 · · · s1/sn
s2/s1 s2/s2 · · · s2/sn
...
...
...
sn/s1 sn/s2 · · · sn/sn


s1
s2
...
sn

= n

s1
s2
...
sn

. (3.2)
The normalized eigenvector, which is unique, associated with λmax is called the
priority vector. If the comparison matrices are perfectly consistent then calculating
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the scores is simple. However in practice the values of si/sj will not necessarily be
accurate.
As long as the matrix is reciprocal (oji = 1/oij), then the principal eigenvalue is
at least as large as the dimension, i.e. λmax ≥ n (Saaty, 1990, p. 13). Reciprocity is a
much easier condition to enforce and ensures that the principle eigenvector is stable
to small perturbations.
AHP follows a three step process to arrive at a decision using the comparison
matrix, preference elicitation, comparison of alternatives and determination of rank.
This can be visualized as a hierarchy with the decision problem at the top, the
alternatives A1, ..., An on the bottom, and the criteria C1, ..., Cm with which to judge
the alternatives in the center
Figure 3.1: Building a Hierarchy for Choosing a Computer.
Preference Elicitation
Once the problem has been formulated as a hierarchy the first step is find the
relative importance of the criteria to the user. This is done without considering the
alternatives. For laptops (figure 3.1) the criteria could be price, hard drive space,
speed, style, etc, which are put into the comparison matrix to derive the set of
weights wk. These represent the relative importance of the criteria with respect
to the decision. In this context equation (3.1) is used to compare the criteria to find
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the values of wi/wj (the objects Oi are replaced with the criteria Ci). The end result
of this process gives the equation (3.2). This is used to solve for the vector consisting
of the weights of each criterion,
~w =

w1
w2
...
wm

, (3.3)
which is the priority vector associated with λmax.i
Comparison of Alternatives
The next step is to evaluate the alternatives by comparing them pairwise on how
strong they are in each criterion. Using equation (3.1), m comparison matrices of size
n × n are completed, where n is the number of alternatives and m is the number of
criteria. The kth matrix compares the alternatives with respect to the kth criterion.
The goal is to find the set (ak1, ..., akn) for each of the criteria, which represent the
rankings of the alternatives with respect to the kth criterion. Thus for each of the
criteria, the priority vector 
ak1
ak2
...
akn

(3.4)
is calculated.
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Determining Rank
Let M be an n × m matrix such that Mij = (aij). By multiplying M with the
weight vector ~w from equation (3.3), a new vector of size n× 1 is created, where the
ith entry in the vector is the final ranking of the ith alternative
M · ~w =

∑m
i=1wia1i∑m
i=1wia2i
...∑m
i=1wiani

. (3.5)
Each entry is the weighted sum of the strengths of the alternatives in each criterion.
The final vector gives the rankings of the products where a higher ranking is a more
suitable alternative.
This chapter has demonstrated the process used by AHP. Using the comparison
matrix, the strengths of the alternatives are measured relative to each other. Subjec-
tive judgements which may not have any intuitive method of measurement can now
be ranked by using the ratio scaling method. This also ensures that all judgements
are scaled in the same way, so as to allow for meaningful comparisons. But while AHP
solves the problem of measuring the strengths of alternatives, it is still necessary to
account for how word of mouth can influence a decision.
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Chapter 4
DIFFUSION AND NETWORKS
Diffusion
Bass (1969) originally proposed a highly successful model for the diffusion of new
products and ideas. The likelihood of purchase at time T with no purchases made
yet is given by (see figure 4.1)
f(T )
1− F (T ) = p+ qF (T ),
where F (T ) is the total number of adopters at time T , f(T ) is the likelihood to
purchase at time T and p, q represent the coefficients of innovation and imitation,
respectively. It is commonly assumed that the coefficient of innovation represents how
many adopt independently or through advertising, while the coefficient of imitation
represents the bandwagon effect, where an increasing number of adopters creates a
positive feedback which in turn creates a larger pressure to adopt. Rogers (2010)
describes the innovation coefficient as starting the process of diffusion with the early
adopters being the innovators. Once there are enough adopters, word of mouth
effects (imitation) dominate the process and almost all potential adopters will decide
to adopt.
While diffusion has seen widespread success, the process of diffusion through word
of mouth is aggregated and does not allow one to understand what underlying dy-
namics are at work. Bass diffusion originally described a simple diffusion process,
even when there could be many factors which influence the rate, or even complete-
ness of the diffusion. In the Bass model, and others like it, all potential adopters are
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Figure 4.1: Plot of F and f , where F is the Cumulative Number of Adopters, and
f is the Number of New Adopters Each Time Period.
assumed to be homogeneous, and it is not specified how communication influences
their decisions (Delre et al., 2007, p. 187). It has also been criticized for not being
suitable for answering what-if type questions (Kiesling et al., 2012, p. 184).
Bandwagons and lock-in
Arthur (1989) proposed a model with a market of two competing technologies.
One of these technologies can become locked-in, creating a situation where it becomes
dominant, essentially forcing the other out of the market. This framework has been
applied to studying VHS vs. Betamax video formats (Katz and Shapiro, 1986, p.
822)(Liebowitz and Margolis, 1995, p. 205), QWERTY vs. Dvorak keyboards (David,
1985, p. 332) (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1995, p. 213) and AC vs. DC electricity
(David and Bunn, 1988, p. 165), for example.
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Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1993) describe bandwagons as a pressure which is
caused by the increasing number of adopters. Even if the product is not the best
available, individuals and organizations will jump on the bandwagon simply because
they see so many others doing so and wish to keep up. Katz and Shapiro (1985)
assume that with more adopters the usefulness and profitability of the product in-
creases. Telephones or fax machines are good examples of products whose utility
increases with more adopters. Bikhchandani et al. (1992) presents a model describing
fads/fashions with bandwagons as an informational cascade, where the quality of a
new product is uncertain to the individual making a decision; the decision maker will
receive a signal about the product as being either good or bad with equal probabil-
ity. Each individual also observes the decision of all those who decided before. Thus
over time the pressure to conform comes from the collective decision of the decision
makers, which can lead to either a profitable or unprofitable product to be locked in.
Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1997), stresses the need for individuals to communi-
cate in a social network. The authors argue that small differences in the structure can
affect the speed and completeness of the diffusion process. Watts (1999) showed that
networks are applicable to a wide variety of fields. In particular many social networks
have been found to conform to a small world structure, where most individuals do
not have a large number of connections but can be connected by only traveling a few
links. Janssen and Jager (2003) further showed the effects of social networks on the
adoption of new products based on word of mouth effects. In their model the utility
of a product is given by
Utility = βS + (1− β)x, (4.1)
where β ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter weight for the sum of the social component and
the strength of the product. The product’s strength is represented by S = 1 −
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|d− p|, which is the difference between the personal preference, p, and the dimension
d (strength of product). The social component, x, is the fraction of friends the
individual has who have adopted the product.
Having reviewed the applications of networks in studying diffusion, fads and word
of mouth effects, it will now be applied to the decision making process in the next
chapter.
16
Chapter 5
DECISION MAKING PROCESS
Following AHP, comparison matrices are generated to calculate weights and rank
products. The matrix M is formed again where each column vector is the priority
vector for the rankings of products with respect to the criteria. As before each row in
M is associated with a product and each column entry is the score of an alternative
with respect to the kth criteria.
In choosing between n products, assume there are m criteria. These are properties
of a product that the decision maker will consider when evaluating their utility, such
as safety when buying a car, battery life for a laptop or price. Each of the criterion can
be either positive or negative. I.e. the utility of a product is increased the stronger
a product is in a positive criterion, and decreased when it is stronger in a negative
criterion. An example of a negative criterion is price, as higher price is less desirable.
Associated with each of the criteria is a weight wk as before, which are calculated
using the comparison matrix.
The value function v(·) from Kahneman and Tversky (1979) will also be used.
To fulfill the three axioms, the function must be concave above the reference point
(v′′ < 0 for x > 0) and convex below (v′′ > 0 for x < 0) (diminishing returns and
reference dependence) and be steeper for positive arguments than negative arguments
(v(x) < v(−x) if x > 0). This model will use the value function from Tversky and
Kahneman (1992),
v+k (x) =
 α(x− r)
γ if x ≥ r
β(−(x− r))δ if x < r
, (5.1)
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Figure 5.1: Value Function for Negative Criteria.
for its simplicity and because it has been shown to fit experimental data well (Stott,
2006, pp. 118-119). Note that the α, β, γ, δ parameters and reference r are dependent
on the criteria. This is the most general case and the actual values are calibrated from
data. For negative criteria, because higher scores should give a decrease in utility,
the function v−k (x) = v
+
k (−x) is defined, which is a reflection about the y-axis.
The zone of insensitivity captures the effect that up to a threshold, small changes
in an criterion (such as price) about a reference does not affect the overall utility.
Several authors (Kalwani and Yim (1992), Bridges et al. (1995), Raman and Bass
(2002)) have found evidence to support the existence of such a region. This effect
can be included in the value function by denoting the minimum threshold needed to
cause a positive change in utility as Zh and the minimum needed to cause a negative
change as Zl. Assuming both constants are positive, the positive value function is
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Figure 5.2: Modified Positive Value Function Showing Insensitivity.
modified as such
v+k (x) =
 α(x− r − Zh)
γ if x ≥ r
β(−(x− r + Zl))δ if x < r
. (5.2)
This will have the effect of creating an interval (r − Zl, r + Zh) about the reference
where the utility does not change.
Word of Mouth
To incorporate word of mouth, assume the decision maker is in a social network,
meaning they have some number of connections to other agents, their friends. When
faced with a choice, said decision maker will seek feedback from their friends about
the product, which can either be positive or negative. Positive and negative word of
mouth are naturally positive and negative criteria, respectively. A vector is formed
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for positive word of mouth,
~p =

a
f1
...
fn

. (5.3)
Here f1, ..., fn represent the (normalized) number of friends of the agent who are
saying positive things about alternatives 1 to n, respectively, and a is the reference
value. Write the negative word of mouth similarly as
~n =

0
g1
...
gn

, (5.4)
where the reference is zero for negative word of mouth is always zero.
Integration
One of the challenges of prospect theory is that it does not specify what a reference
should be. Two common references, for example, would be a product one already owns
and what one expects to own in the future; each reference can lead to significantly
different choice outcomes. For this theory a generic reference product comparable to
the products in the decision is assumed. The alternatives and the reference will be
evaluated with respect to each criteria (except for word of mouth, which uses ~p and ~n)
which is used to create each matrix Rk, where (Rk)ij represents the relative advantage
of alternative i over alternative j using AHP. Note the first row and column (Rk)1,j
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and (Rk)i,1 correspond to the reference product in this instance,
Rk =

urk/urk · · · urk/unk
u1k/urk · · · u1k/unk
...
...
unk/urk · · · unk/unk

. (5.5)
Solving for the principal right eigenvector gives the rankings of the products for
this criteria (urk , u1k , · · · , unk)t, where urk is the ranking for the reference product.
Iterating through each criterion and completing this process for each of the m criteria
will give the values for the relative strength of each product with respect to each of
the criteria. From this the matrix M is formed and functions v+ and v− are applied
as appropriate. At this point the matrix is different from AHP in two fundamental
ways, first the row for reference product was removed and used to parameterize the
value functions. Second, the word of mouth criteria is the sum of the positive and
negative word of mouth. This means that enough negative feedback on a product
will cancel the positive feedback. However negative feedback is weighted more than
the equivalent amount of positive feedback because the value function weighs losses
more than gains,
M =

v
+/−
1 (u11) · · · v+/−n (u1m)
...
...
... v+social(~p) + v
−
social(~n)
v
+/−
1 (un1) · · · v+/−n (unm)
 , (5.6)
where each v
+/−
k (·) the value urk is used as the reference
v+k (x) =

α
√
x− urk − Zh if x ≥ urk + Zh
β
√−(x− urk + Zl) if x ≤ urk − Zl
0 else
. (5.7)
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Multiplying this matrix and the weight vector
(
w1, ..., wm,
ws
2
)t
, where ws is the weight
for word of mouth, gives the overall rankings of
∑m
i=1wiv
+/−
i (u1i)
...∑m
i=1wiv
+/−
i (uni)
+ ws2 (v+social(~p) + v−social(~n)) . (5.8)
The weight ws
2
is used to avoid weighing the word of mouth too much relative to the
other criteria. The sum in the jth row is the score for the jth product. This contains
the ranking of the products as in AHP, relative to the reference. Also note that the
value function applied to the vectors ~p and ~n is applied element-wise to the entries of
said vectors.
Example
To see how reference dependence and word of mouth have an effect on the decision,
consider three alternatives, computer A, computer B and computer C. Each will be
compared on the criteria speed and graphics. To do this, the weights for the criteria
must be calculated. Here the graphics are considered three times as important as
speed is, and word of mouth twice as important as speed. This leads to a hypothetical
comparison matrix

Speed Graphics Word of Mouth
Speed 1 1/3 1/2
Graphics 3 1 1/2
Word of Mouth 2 2 1
. (5.9)
This matrix is slightly inconsistent, which makes the largest eigenvalue 3.1357 just
over the expected eigenvalue of 3, which a consistent 3× 3 matrix would give. Calcu-
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lating the priority vector by finding the eigenvector and normalizing gives the weights
as: ~w = (0.1677, 0.3487, 0.4836)t.
For each criterion the products are compared, with the exception of word of mouth,
a comparison matrix is generated where each entry is the relative strength of one
product over another. As before, the following are hypothetical matrices which are
slightly inconsistent
Speed

A B C
A 1 1/5 3
B 5 1 2
C 1/3 1/2 1
 (5.10)
Graphics

A B C
A 1 1/3 1/4
B 3 1 1/4
C 4 4 1
. (5.11)
Because the decision maker is also considering the decisions of his/her friends, two
more vectors are created, ~p for positive word of mouth, and ~n for negative word of
mouth
~p =

20
70
60
 ~n =

30
20
20
 . (5.12)
Calculating the priority vectors from (5.10) and (5.11) along with the (normalized)
word of mouth vectors, a new matrix is formed where each column is one of the
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calculated vectors

A 0.2377 0.1130 0.1333 0.4286
B 0.6072 0.2351 0.4667 0.2857
C 0.1551 0.6519 0.4000 0.2857
. (5.13)
Using only AHP with word of mouth, the ranking of the products is calculated by
multiplying this matrix by the weight vector ~w from (5.9)

A 0.2377 0.1130 0.1333 0.4286
B 0.6072 0.2351 0.4667 0.2857
C 0.1551 0.6519 0.4000 0.2857


0.1677
0.3487
0.2418
0.2418

=

0.2151
0.3657
0.4191
 . (5.14)
According to this calculation, product C is the best choice. However, if the decision
maker already owns one of these products, say product A, and uses it as a reference,
then prospect theory can be applied. Note that the negative word of mouth vector,
~n, now has to change to ~n = (0, 20, 20)t, because product A is now the reference, and
for simplicity no reference will be used for negative word of mouth.
B v+Speed(0.6072) v+Graphics(0.2351) v+social(0.4667) + v−social(0.2857)
C v+Speed(0.1551) v
+
Graphics(0.6519) v
+
social(0.4000) + v
−
social(0.2857)
. (5.15)
The value function is used with the following parameters and r depending on the
criteria
v+(x) =

√
x− r if x ≥ r
−2√−(x− r) if x < r . (5.16)
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Applying the value function gives
B 0.6079 0.3494 −0.4917
C −0.5748 0.7341 −0.5526
. (5.17)
When the matrix is multiplied by the weight vector,
B 0.6079 0.3494 −0.4917
C −0.5748 0.7341 −0.5526


0.1677
0.3487
0.2418
 , (5.18)
the following scores are calculated
B 0.1049
C 0.0260
. (5.19)
This shows a reversal of rank due to the reference. This is partially due to the
endowment effect, where the decision maker owns product A which is almost twice as
fast as C. Indeed, deciding to purchase C would mean a loss of speed, which is much
more important than gains in graphics, for which both B and C are better.
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Chapter 6
MARKET DATA
In the original paper describing prospect theory, data was collected from students at
various universities (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 264). Later in their paper on
cumulative prospect theory, similar experiments were conducted with Stanford and
Berkeley graduate students (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992, p. 305). In each case, the
individuals were asked to choose which of two prospects (outcome x with probability
p or outcome y with probability q) would give the highest utility. This data was used
to estimate parameters for the weighting and value functions.
This thesis, however, analyzes data from retail sales of technology to find evidence
that the market behaves in the same way as an individual. Specifically, since there is
no uncertainty in specifications of the technology (the criteria), the data is examined
for evidence that the market as a whole behaves in the same way as an individual in
determining the success of a product.
Because sales is one of the clearest indicators of utility, the assumption is made
that the number of units sold of a product corresponds to the utility of that product.
One would then expect that similar products which differ in only one dimension will
show loss aversion. I.e. with respect to a reference, decreases in that dimension will
show a greater loss of utility than the equivalent gain. Additionally, larger changes in
that dimension will eventually level out, showing decreasing sensitivity to marginal
changes.
Anonymized data for retail sales of notebook computers by price was supplied
by Intel Corporation for years 2013 and 2014, and included the average selling price
(ASP) binned to the nearest $100 dollars, the amount of RAM in the laptop, and the
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(a). ASP (b). Memory
Figure 6.1: Unit Sales Plotted Against ASP and Memory.
size of the display.
Figures 6.1a and 6.1b show the sum of the sales of laptops for each criterion
from both years, with a nonlinear regression done to find the parameters of the value
function (equation 5.1). Because the data is sensitive, the actual numbers have not
been included. Additionally, all results presented have been re-scaled to mask the
actual numbers without changing the trends.
The reference chosen is the weighted mean of the criteria where the weights are
the unit sales. This is shown with the dashed vertical line in figures 6.1a, 6.1b and
6.2. Decreases in memory and display, along with increases in price show decreases
in sales, implying loss aversion. Additionally, the decrease in unit sales levels out the
larger losses, implying a decreasing sensitivity. Gains in the criteria, price discounts,
larger memory capacity, and bigger displays, unexpectedly also show fewer unit sales.
However, where the sales are expected to increase or stay the same for gains
(price discounts, larger memory capacity, and bigger displays), they instead decrease
sharply, implying that any change relative to the reference is perceived as a loss.
While this is not what prospect theory predicts, it bares resemblance to the results
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Figure 6.2: Unit Sales Plotted Against Display Size.
of Bridges et al. (1995), who find the same sharp decrease in any deviation from the
reference. The explanation offered is that potential customers will judge the quality
of a product based on price, and infer lower priced units must be inferior in quality.
This does not explain why small discounts from the expected price are perceived as
a loss of utility.
In addition to laptops, sales data for smartphones and tablet computers were
provided by Intel Corporation. This data had much more detail provided, both
unit sales and ASP of each product was given per quarter from 2010Q1 to 2014Q1.
Because the products were available at different times and for different lengths (some
were introduced late, or reached the end of their life earlier), the average sales per
quarter is used as the basis for comparisons.
In figure 6.3, the average selling price varies by small amounts. It is necessary to
bin the data in a useful way. By looking at figure 6.3, one can identify the clusters
of prices with a high volume of sales. To identify these clusters and use them as bins
to aggregate the sales, an algorithm was written which is described in the appendix.
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Figure 6.3: Smartphone and Tablet Sales by ASP.
Figures 6.4a and 6.4b are created by summing the sales at each bin and plotting
that against the ASP. Using the weighted mean of ASPs again as the reference,
indicated by the dashed lines, the data points are fitted to the function in equation
5.3 using nonlinear least squares, with a regression done for gains and losses separately.
The analysis on the smartphone and tablet data show that utility is increasing with
cheaper products with respect to the reference. However the utility from decreases in
price does is not concave, which is predicted by prospect theory.
Figures 6.5a and 6.5b are generated using a different reference, using a price lower
than the smallest ASP bin. In this context all the smartphone and tablets could be
seen as losses relative to this hypothetical cheap laptop and provides a better fit for
the data. While using such a low priced laptop does not necessarily reflect reality,
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(a). Tablets (b). Smartphones
Figure 6.4: Binned Sales for Tablets and Smartphones.
(a). Tablets (b). Smartphones
Figure 6.5: Binned Sales for Tablets and Smartphones with a Reference ASP Lower
Than What is Offered.
it does demonstrates one of the difficulties of prospect theory, that using different
references give different results (Barberis, 2012, p.178).
While sometimes there is evidence that the market obeys some of the features of
prospect theory, it is not clear if it is an overall trend. This is partly because of the
difficulty in knowing what the reference should be, and also because there are other
factors which can skew the data, such as extremely low priced laptops.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has presented a model for the decision process of a consumer. Because
demand is an essential input to many models intended to help managers optimize
inventory control or decide prices, understanding the dynamics of how the consumer
makes a decision is important.
Prospect theory is a widely successful theory which captures the irrationality of
consumers. It accounts for the effects of reference dependence, where gains or losses
are relative to a reference, loss aversion, where losses are perceived as larger than
gains, and diminishing sensitivity, where marginal changes in utility have diminished
influence.
Kahneman and Tversky’s value function is the basis for this thesis, but there is
an inherit problem with measuring what is meant by gains or losses in a product
attribute, especially with attributes that are purely subjective. This is resolved by
applying the analytic hierarchy process, which allows for measuring these intangible
properties. These measurements are used as an input to the functions of prospect
theory to account for people’s subjective biases in thinking.
While AHP and prospect theory are intended to reflect an individual’s decision
process, it is not complete without accounting for social dynamics in the decision, This
is supported by a wealth of evidence (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1997, pp. 289-
290)(Delre et al., 2007, pp. 186-188) showing that people routinely base decisions on
word of mouth. The hugely successful Bass model is itself predicated on this idea.
The effects of social interaction and the word of mouth on the decision process was
added as an attribute in the AHP process.
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This model was applied to retail sales data provided by Intel. The unit sales,
which was assumed to be an indicator of utility, was analyzed for evidence that the
market as a whole behaves similarly to prospect theory. However there was not a lot
of evidence to support this hypothesis. This failure can mostly by attributed to the
fact that prospect theory, and also this model, are intended to describe an individual
and those individual consumers may vary widely in their value functions and reference
points.
Further research with data may solve the question of market sales arising from
many irrational individuals. It should focus classifying the individuals in a market
and accounting for their differences. Aggregating the individuals to find the distribu-
tions of prospect theory’s parameters can help test the hypothesis that the market is
composed of many individuals making judgements consistent with prospect theory.
Another extension of the model is to create a more sophisticated approach to the
social component. People may weigh the reliability of the network partners differently,
which can be captured by using the weighting method in AHP. Additionally, positive
and negative feedback may only be part of what goes into a person’s decision, and
many papers detailing complex behaviors associated with fads, fashions and diffusion
may be relevant. Different networks can also be used to classify different groups of
consumers. For example, the network of industry professionals may be quite different
than the network of teenagers.
Finally the work presented in this thesis can be implemented in an agent based
simulation to study the dynamics of the demand and the sensitivity of the model to
parameters.
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APPENDIX A
BINNING ALGORITHM
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This algorithm takes as an input the ASP values and the associated unit sales
at each ASP. It returns a two dimensional array, one dimension being ASP, the
second being ones and zeros, which are the entries where there is a high volume of
sales. It takes two parameters BAR and SENSITIVITY. BAR is the cut-off threshold
where anything above is considered a high sale, and below is considered a low sale.
SENSITIVITY is how sensitive the algorithm is to detecting clusters.
In creating this array the algorithm puts each entry as either a one, if sales at that
entry is above the BAR parameter, or a zero, if sales are below BAR. It then takes
that array and counts the number of sequential ones and zeros. If it reads a one, it
assumes it is in a high-sales cluster and does nothing. If it detects a sequence of zeros
which is shorter in length than SENSITIVITY it changes those entries to ones. If
it detects a sequence of zeros longer than SENSITIVITY then it assumes it is in a
low-sales cluster and does nothing. This is because there can be individual entries of
low-sales within a cluster of high-sales, for which it is desirable to still be considered
a part of a high sales cluster.
The output is an array of alternating sequences of ones and zeros (and each entry
is associated with a price point), each sequence is at least as long as SENSITIVITY.
For each sequence of ones, the weighted arithmetic mean of the corresponding ASPs
is taken as the bin. Each weight is the number of sales at that ASP from before the
algorithm started. The calculated mean is then used as a bin. Increasing the BAR
parameter or decreasing the SENSITIVITY will give more bins and vice versa.
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Data: Unit sales by ASP
Result: Locations of clusters
SET parameter SENSITIVITY as an integer
SET parameter BAR as a floating point
SET variable NUMBER-OF-CONSECUTIVE-ZEROS as 0
SET variable NOT-IN-CLUSTER as TRUE
SET variable LAST-ONE as 0
SET variable CURRENT-INDEX as 0
for Each ASP do
if Units at current ASP ≤ BAR then
Set unit sales to 0
else
Set unit sales at ASP to 1
end
end
while CURRENT-INDEX is not at the end of the data do
while NOT-IN-CLUSTER do
if Units at CURRENT-INDEX of ASP == 1 then
Set NOT-IN-CLUSTER to FALSE. Set LAST-ONE as
CURRENT-INDEX.
end
Increment CURRENT-INDEX. BREAK if at end of data.
end
while |LAST-ONE - CURRENT-INDEX| < SENSE do
if Units at CURRENT-INDEX of ASP == 1 then
Set units sold of all ASP from LAST-ONE to CURRENT-INDEX
to 1. Set LAST-ONE to CURRENT-INDEX.
end
Increment CURRENT-INDEX. BREAK if at end of data.
end
end
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